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AbstrAct
the paper examines the Black sea question in the second half of the 15th century, with 
special emphasis on crusading and religious questions. Based on selection of recently 
discovered italian archival sources, the study focuses on a series of pivotal moments 
in the history of the region: the battle of Belgrade (1456), the fall of caffa (1475) 
and the ottoman conquest of chilia and cetatea albă/ akkerman (1484). all three 
events implied a succession of extreme reactions, both in military and in ideological 
terms, vivid proofs for the pressures and the stakes of those times. such aspects tend 
to be particulary relevant if the religiously and ethnically mixed character of the areas 
under analysis is taken into account. Moverover, under these circumstances, it is 
highly noteworthy that “figures”, previously predominantly regarded as “traitors of 
the cross” become its “heroes” (e.g. the genoese in 1456 or the Walachians in 1475), 
supplementing the number of the crusaders confronting the ottoman power, in a time 
when also the ranks of the “partners” of the Turk was growing, until he was “officially” 
accepted as an “european partner” through the peace of Buda (1503).1
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Prior to the decisive confrontations between the Ottoman army and the crusaders 
at Belgrade (July 21-23, 1456), ‘the free Christian world’ awaited a new disaster 
that had to complete the catastrophe of 1453 and open Italia and Germania as well 
to the Ottoman power. The almost desperate attempts of Serbian despot George 
Branković and Walachian ruler Wladislaw II (both, until then, the ‘sworn’ enemies of 
hero John Hunyadi) to halt Mehmed II's northern advance had ended badly in June. 
The ‘crusaders of Belgrade’ were one step away from fighting each other, for reasons 
of tongue or for motifs of social rank. Hunyadi's ‘professionals’ and Giovanni da 
Capestrano's ‘penitents’ had great chances of becoming martyrs if they did not kill 
each other before falling into Ottoman spears. However, the miracle took place. 
Mehmed had to retreat. The Christian dreams began. Constantinople was to be 
recovered, then Nazareth and eventually Jerusalem. For a good while, in that 
summer and autumn of 1456, many actually believed that Constantinople had been 
liberated2.
At that time, John Hunyadi had died. Viewed as the true heir to the imperial 
crown of Constantine XI Palaeologus (by the Greeks in his entourage), as the mythical 
founder of Byzantium, the Yanko bin Madyan (by the Ottomans Turks), the late hero 
2. For the events of 1455-1456: Hofer, Johnnes. “Der Sieger von Belgrad”. Historisches Jahrbuch, 51 
(1931): 163-212; Babinger, Franz. Der Quellenwert der Berichte über den Entsatz von Belgrad am 21/22 Juli. 
1456 (off-print Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, NS, VIII (1956). Munich: Bayr.
Akad.d.Wiss., 1957); Housley, Norman. “Giovanni da Capistrano and the Crusade of 1456”, Crusading in 
the Fifteenth Century: Message and Impact, Norman Housley, ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004: 94-115; 
Simon, Alexandru. “The Lion in Winter: John Hunyadi from Kossovopolje to Belgrade”, Between Worlds. 
Extincta est lucerna orbis: John Hunyadi and his Time, Ana Dumitran, Loránd Mádly, Alexandru Simon, ed. 
Cluj-Napoca: Editura Academia Românǎ, 2008: 491-522. For a documentary overview of the political 
context, we have selected data from the various reports that circulated through the Italian Peninsula in 
the summer of 1456: [...] El Turcho [Mehmed II] era venuto verso le parte de Valachia [ruled by Wladislaw II, 
who was eventually attacked from back and dethroned by the future Vlad III of Walachia, better known as 
Dracula, who abandoned John Hunyadi, whose captain he was at that time, and sided with Mehmed II] e del/ 
despoto de Rassia [George (Đurađ) Branković] cum grande zente. El quale despoto credio havesse cum desordine/ 
cum alchune zente circha persone VIIIIm ando per assaltarli, ma trovo li Turchi bene/ in ordine et hebe la pegore. Ne 
rimaso prexi et morti la piu parte d’essi VIIIm./ Poy el prefato Turcho sente ch’el Papa [Calixt III], la Maesta del Re 
d’Aragona [Alphonse V] et ducha de Burgogna [Philipp the Good] andavano/ overo mandavano alchuna possanza 
verso Constantinopoli, delibero de ritornare indireto/ per provedere a dicta citta de Constantinopoli. Et cossi ritorno cum 
una parte de sua/ zente piu utille. Li altri sono restati ad damni del prefato despoto e de Valachi. / El Brancho [John 
Hunyadi, known in the Italian Peninsula as Brancho or Jancho too] sta la vicino ad guarda del Danubio; 
aspetta grande exercito de/ Ungari, quali non porano metersi insieme fine non sia facto el recolto [...] (Venice, 18th of 
July 1456). [...] El Turcho e ad campo ad/ Belgrado in forma che non se speranza di securirlo. El Brancho e retracto 
doe giornate piu que qua. Se dice bene che Ungari se unischano per securilo, ma qua/ non se ha troppo bona speranza 
[...] (Venice, 28th of June 1456). [...] Del Turcho non ce altro de novo salvo che cum grande navillio e entrato in lo 
Danubio, ma che la peste e/ grandissima in lo exercito suo. L’imperatore [Frederick III of Habsburg] pero ha discordio 
cum lo conte de Cil [Ulrich de Cilly] et ha facto grande/ concentratione ad aiuto de Ungari. El ducha Steffano [Stephen 
Košarca, duke of Saint Sabbas, the future Herzegovina] christiano fa grande pratiche in Albania per li favori del 
Turcho, et persuadio ogniuno se arambi al Imperatore Turcho como/ al mazore signore del mondo. Et asay se dubita che 
degli Albanesi [in example the local rivals of Skanderbeg] non se lassano pravaricare/ ad dicti conforti del ducha 
Steffano quale de grande signore in dicte parte [...] (Venice, 23rd of July 1456, the day the battle of Belgrade ended 
with the start of the Ottoman retreat). The quoted sources come from the Archivio di Stato di Milano, Milano 
(ASM), Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Venezia, fasc. 343, 1456, fasc. 6-7, Giugno-Luglio, nn). Used 
abbreviations: ASM, Archivio di Stato di Milano.
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had started as a misfit and reached immense power and prestige in the 1440s. It 
was time for another ‘set’ of misfits to take center stage and prolong the existence of 
the hopes and dreams born by the ‘miracle of Belgrade’. That is at least what a letter 
in an Italian archive suggests. In fact, it was drafted before news of Hunyadi's death 
arrived. This might indicate that there was plenty of room for misfits which could 
have redeemed (the) Christian honor and resurrected an elusive dream. At any rate, 
it completed the background that enabled also some altogether sketchy plans for 
the canonization of the later hero. But he had been at least as mortal and sinful 
(given also his bribing that contributed to the crusader disaster of Varna) as the ‘new 
liberators’3.
1. Crusading, Trade and Treason in the East
The Genoese had two crusader deadly sins: Nicopolis and Varna. In 1396, they had 
supplied to Bayezid I the plans of the crusader army. In 1444, they had provided Murad 
II with the ships that had allowed him to urgently return to Europe and take the ‘new 
crusaders’ by surprise. ‘Obviously’, not all Genoese had been involved. Nonetheless, the 
image of the centrifugal Genoese colonial empire bled because of the instrumental role 
played by the Genoese in the East during the Balkan and Pontic rise of the Ottomans 
and because of their slave trade (which, contrary even to ‘more liberal rules’, also 
involved many Christian slaves). However, the fall of Byzantium (for which they had 
been blamed too at first) had basically thrown them into the arms of the crusade. It 
was not just the theater of Christian duty. Venice too, Genoa's archrival, believed the 
crusader commitment of the Ligurian republic. It was not just a desperate involvement, 
but a practical one. Genoa had refused to support Hunyadi against the Turk because she 
viewed him as already too weak. In return, she had invested considerably in the fleet 
that had to attack Mehmed in the Eastern Mediterranean4.
3. See, for instance: Yerasimos, Stéphane. “Enquête sur un héros: Yanko bin Madyan, le fondateur mythique 
de Constantinople”, Mélanges offerts á Louis Bazin par ses disciples, collègues et amis, Jean-Louis Bracqué-
Grammont, Louis Bazin et alii, ed. Paris: Éditions L’Harmattan, 1992: 213–217 (with reference also to 
the matter of the feared, by the Ottoman Turks, Benī asfer nations in the north, to which the Magyars/ 
Hungarians too belonged); Szabó, Péter. “Heilige Haltungen und ritterliche Merkmale im Kultus des 
Johannes Hunyadi”, Between Worlds, Maggie Goh, Craig Stephenson, eds. Oakville: Ricon Publishers, 1989: 
II, 169-171; Mureşan, Dan Ioan. “Le royaume de Hongrie et la prise de Constantinople: croisade et union 
ecclésiastique en 1453”, Between Worlds...: II, 489-490.
4. For Genoa's oriental policies: Gioffré, Domenico. Il mercato degli schiavi a Genova nel secolo XV. Genoa: Fratelli 
Bozzi, 1971; López, Roberto S. “Venise et Gênes: deux styles, une reussite”, Su e giù per la storia di Genova. Genoa: 
Università di Genoa-Instituto di paleografia e storia medievale, 1975: 35-42; Basso, Enrico. “From Cooperation 
to Clash of Interesets: Genoa and the Turks in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries”, The Turks, Hasan Celal 
Güzel, Cem Oğuz, Osman Karatay, Murat Ocak, eds. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2002: III, 175-184; Somaini, 
Francesco. “Les relations complexes entre Sigismond de Luxembourg et les Visconti, ducs de Milan”, Sigismund 
von Luxemburg. Ein Kaiser in Europa, Michel Pauly, François Reinert, eds. Mainz am Rhein: Philipp von Zabern, 
2006: 157-198; Origone, Sandra. “La fine del dominio grecol nel Mar Nero”. Bizantinistica. Rivista di Studi 
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The Jews bore the cross of treason. Virtually almost all crusader movements 
and actual crusades had been accompanied by pogroms or, at least, by anti-
Jewish decisions. At best, the Jews got off, like in Hungary or Moldavia in the 
1470s, with a mass-taxation and a persecution (in Moldavia). The, nevertheless 
‘accidental’, moment when the Jewish army core would join Matthias Corvinus’ 
conquering parade through the streets of Vienna (1485) was in the remote future. 
Besides, the Jews were percieved, at least as much as the schismatics, as loyal tools 
of the Muslim power. Their commercial rivalries with the Latins and the Greeks 
in the Orient further aggravated the condemnation of the Jews. It is certain only 
that, after the crusader triumph of Granada (1492), the Porte sheltered Moors 
and Jews alike. From this point of view, the political intelligence and the relative 
tolerance (namely until the second third of the 1500s) of the Ottomans was 
largely fatal for the crusader ‘image of the Jew’5.
These pariahs of the Christian crusader world were ‘granted’ the glory of 
fighting over the already holy too city of Constantine. The honor was bestowed 
upon them by the Venetians. Half a joke, half a serious rumor (at any rate it was 
important enough to be recorded by the only network of informants comparable 
to that of Venice in the Christian world), this ‘story’ made its way via a copied 
letter into Italia at the end of August 1456. Still, like most contemporaries, 
including those at the papal curia or those who obtained the information for 
the interests of Milan, the author(s) of the news did not know that Hunyadi 
had died two weeks earlier (August 11). They talked of Capestrano, of Ladislas 
V, who, after fleeing the kingdom long before the arrival of the Turk, could have 
become the great victor of that year. With or without, John, the captain who had 
Bizantini e Slavi, 8 (2006): 245-272 (here pages 249-254); Simon, Alexandru. “The ‘Captain’ and the ‘Superba’: 
Crusader Moments in the Relations between John Hunyadi and Genoa”, Between Worlds...: II, 333-364.
5. Makki, Mahmoud. “The Political History of al-Andalus (92/811-897/1492)”, The Legacy of Muslim 
Spain, Salma Khadra Jayyusi, Manuela Marín, eds. Leiden-New York: Brill, 1992: 84; Harvey, Leonard 
Patrick. “The Political, Social and Cultural History of the Moriscos”, The Legacy of Muslim...: 205; Gow, 
Andrew. “The Jewish Antichrist in Medieval and Early Modern Germany”. Medieval Encounters, 2/3 
(1996): 249-285, McMichael, Steven J. “The End of the World, Antichrist, and the Final Conversion 
of the Jews in the ‘Fortalitium Fidei’ of Friar Alonso de Espina (d. 1464)”. Medieval Encounters, 
12/2 (2006): 224-273. The Jews north of the Danube after 1453-1456: Simon, Alexandru. Ştefan 
cel Mare şi Matia Corvin. O coexistenţă medievală. Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2007: 280-
282 (Translation: Simon, Alexandru. Stephen the Great and Matthias Corvinus: A Medieval Coexistence. 
Cluj-Napoca: Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2007) (to which we add a document from spring 1475 
misplaced, under the year 1493, in: ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Venezia, cart. 
381, Giugno-Dicembre 1493, fasc. 4, Settembre. nn; according to Venice's plan presented before 
pope Sixtus IV, the Jews in Hungary and Moldavia could and should have supplied most of the 
resources needed for the crusade against Mehmed II, which led to a serious conflict between Stephen 
III of Moldavia and the Jews, a conflict so serious that in the early 1500s, the learned Elie Capsali of 
Crete, a Venetian subject, claimed that the conflict between the Molda-vian ruler and the Jews had 
been the cause of the Moldavian-Ottoman war as Meh-med II stepped in to protect the Jews; for Elie 
Capsali: Halévy, Mayer J. “Les guerres de Etienne le Grand et d’Uzun Hasan d’après la ‘Chronique de 
la Turquie’ du candiote Elie Capsali (1520)”. Studia et Acta Orientalia, 1, (1957): 189-197).
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saved his posterity at Belgrade, the, until then, frightened ‘free Christian world’ 
was however ready to accept and to assume the liberation of Constantinople6.
6. ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Venezia, cart. 343, 1456, fasc. 8, Agosto, nn 
(August 25, 1456; both the sender and the recipient are otherwise unknown, even though Antonio 
Murin<i>o, appears to have been one of the first Venetian recipients (and senders) of the news on 
the fall of Byzantium (the letters can be found in: ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, 
Venezia, cart. 340, 1450-1453, fasc. 4, 1453, nn). One of his letters on the fall reached Milan via 
possibly the same Dulceto, recorded in the Milanese copy of the letter as Alberto [not as Chilberto, 
like in 1456] Dulceto in Ferrara. [...] Sono avisato chome in Constantinopoli e stato tolto da Genovesi [...]/ 
El capitolo della lettera dice per essere el Turcho [Mehmed II] in campo haveva tolto molte/ monitoni fora di 
Constantinopoli et pro essere in dicto luogho grande mortalitade/ et li Turchi che erano in guardia del detto 
luogho l’aviano abandonato et/ lasciado in guardia alli Giudei, et giognendo in Constantinopoli quattro navi/ 
grosse di Genovesi, con persone 1800 per nave, per andare in percorso di Capha [Genoese merchants, with 
such large vessels and “crews” on the road to their Crimean Caffa, were usually slave traders in the 
first place and “less crusaders”, although Genoa feared greatly a potential loss of the city, which 
the Ligurian government had been com-pelled to hand over to the Bank of San Giorgio after the 
fall of Byzantium],/ et pare per quello si dice che se missono in contencione con li Giudei, et cosi i Genovesi/ 
sono intrati in Constantinopoli [Milanese copy, preserved among the secret reports from Venice, of the 
letter of Antonio Murin<i>o/ Qu<i>rin<i>o [?] to Chilberto [?] Dulceto, and dated by the former: 
Datum die XXV augusti, <Venice> in papariis 1456]. [On the same sheet, in partial at least consonance 
with lines of the letter on the Genoese, another copied report, recieved also from Venice, followed]. 
Copia alcune lettere de Venetiis// La nova de Ungaria vene confirmada si da terra come da mare et dice/ come 
fratre Giovanni da Capestrano [notorious for his anti-Semitic preachings, yet forced on the eve of the 
siege of Belgrade to ask both Jews and Schismatics, previously his main targets, alongside the Turks, 
for aid] predica e confortava la brigna [instead of brigata; brigna (prugna in modern Italian) had a 
condescent meaning in regard to the ‘common’ crusaders and their mind (their plum)] ad essi/ valenti, 
et come lo prevadore [title still used for Hunyadi, though he had resigned as governor of Hungary 
in winter 1452-1453] et lo Re de Ungaria [Ladislas V] ere d’acordo et fano/ grandissimo apare<c>chio 
per andare in persona contra al Turcho [undated]. Capestrano in the context of the 1450s: Damian, 
Iulian Mihai. Ioan de Capestrano şi Cruciada Târzie. Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română-Centrul de Studii 
Transilvane, (PhD Dissertation, 2008: 90-94. (Translation: Damian, Iulian Mihai. John Capestran 
and the Late Crusade. Cluj-Napoca: Academia Română-Centrul de Studii Transilvane, (PhD 
Dissertation, 2008). The Greek and Latin problematic of Byzantium as a holy city is well revealed 
in: Werner, Ernst. “‘Translatio Imperii ad Turcos’: päpstliche ‘Renovatio’ und Weltkaiseridee nach 
dem Fall Constantinopels”. Byzantinische Forschungen, 11 (1987): 465-472; Carile, Maria Cristina. 
“Constantinople and the Heavenly Jerusalem?: Through the Imperial Palace”. Bizantinistica. Rivista 
di Studi Bizantini e Slavi, 8 (2006): 85-104; Blanchet, Marie-Hélène. Georges-Gennadios Scholarios (vers 
1400-vers 1472). Un intellectuel orthodoxe face à la disparition de l’Empire byzantin. Paris: Institut français 
d’études byzantines, 2008. For the Milanese system: Margaroli, Paolo. Diplomazia e stati rinascimentali. 
Le ambascerie sforzesche fino alla conclusione della Lega italica (1450-1455). Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1992. 
In this context, a passage from the letter sent by Giovanni, bishop of Pavia, to the duke of Milan, 
Francesco Sforza, from Wiener Neustadt, might be interesting: Illustrissimo Signore Mio, de novelle di 
Turchi poso la vittoria de Nandoralba [Belgrade] de la quale scripsi/ alla Signoria Vestra et mandavi la copia 
de le lettere de Jo vaynoda [John Hunyadi; no sign of abbreviation accompanies the name Jo] e sequiter/ 
la morte del dicto Jo [likewise] vaynoda. Item se dice della morte del Grande Turcho./ Item se dice che li Turchi 
sono caciati de Constantinopoli, non lo credo buono./ Lo Re [Ladislas V] se tira di lo Realme de Ongaria. El 
Conte de Cili [Ulrich von Cilly] fa tucto./ Monsegniore de Sancto Angelo [cardinal Juan Carvajal] e in 
Nandoralba. Grande quantita de crucisignati/ sono la. Io in tre die ne ho mettuto fora de Vienna circha/ VIm 
bene armati, et li ho accompagnati fine alle nave, et lo Re sorpresso e/ venuto ad vedere. Se Dio me fa dar gratia 
de fare questa pace, ho speranza/ se ordenara grande exercito in questo paese [Austria] maximo per lo anno 
sequenter (ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze estere, Germania, cart. 569, 1450-1458, fasc. 7, 
1456, nn 29th of August 1456; this was not a one of a kind message).
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2. The Genoese Recovery of Byzantium
In that summer (and not only) there was mixture of hope and confusion revealed 
also by the letter's dating: in the porridge of <the year> 1456.
Sono avisato choe in Constantinopoli e stato tolto di Genovesi per lo modo infradiecto./ 
El capitolo della lettera dice per che el Turcho [Mehmed II] in campo haveva tolto molte/ 
monitoni fora di Constantinopoli et perche esse in dicto luogho grande mortalitade/ et li Turchi 
esi erano in guardis del dicto luogho havano abandonato et/ laserado in guardis alli Giudei, 
et giongendo in Constantinopoli quattro navi/ grosse di Genovesi cum persone 1800, per nave, 
per andare, in percorso di Capha/ et pare per quello si dice essere missono in contencione con 
li Giudei, cosi i Genovesi/ sono intrati in Constantinopoli (August 25, 1456; Milanese copy, 
preserved amongst the Venetian secret reports, of the letter sent by patrician Antonio 
Murino to his friend Chilberto Dulceto, both otherwise virtually unknown characters; 
dated by the former: Datum die XXV augusti, [in Venice] in papariis 1456).
[On the same sheet, in partial at least consonance with lines from above, another 
copied report, also from Venice, followed].
Copia alcune lettere de Venetiis// La nova de Ungaria vene confirmada li da terra come da mare 
et dice/ come fratre Giovanni da Capestrano predica e confortava la brigna [prugna in modern 
Italian; it had an obviously condescent meaning in regard to the ‘common’ crusaders and their 
mind, that is their plum] ad essi/ valenti, et come lo prevadore [title still used for John Hunyadi, 
who had resigned as governor of Hungary three years ago] et lo Re de Ungaria [Ladislas V the 
Posthumous] ene d’acordo e fano/ grandissimo aparecoso per andare in personi contro al Turcho.
At least, for a Milanese perspective, the only time span comparable, in terms of 
intensity and mixture of news and plans of anti-Ottoman essence with those months 
of 1456, was later the period marked by the arrival of the news on the fall of Caffa and 
on the Moldavian-Hungarian campaign in Walachia (August 1475-November 1476), 
Then, for more than a year, basically not one day passed without at least one report 
or news on pro or anti-Ottoman activities. However, seemingly, no other ‘liberation of 
Constantinople’ surfaced, though plans were still drafted for its recovery. Perhaps, 
the desperation and relief were not that great as they had been three years after the 
fall of Byzantium. Maybe also the personalities of the 1470s lacked the career and the 
‘panache’ of those at Belgrade. Possibly, all was due also to the fact that the Genoese 
had lost Caffa, while the Jews, at least those in king Matthias’ service had other 
tasks too7.
7. In this context, in direct relation to the other crusader Christian-Muslim front: Gómez, Lino. Un español al 
servicio de la Santa Sede, Don Juan de Carvajal: cardenal de Sant’Angelo legado en Alemania y Hungría, 1399?-1469. 
Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas-Instituto Jerónomo Zurita, 1947; Navarro, Miguel. 
Calixto III Borja y Alfonso el Magnánimo frente a la Cruzada. Valencia: Ajuntament de València, 2003. For the 1470s: 
Simon, Alexandru. “The Costs and Benefits of Anti-Ottoman Warfare: Documents on the Case of Moldavia 
(1475-1477)”. Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, 48/1-2 (2009): 37-53. The effectives of the ‘Genoese armada’ were 
clearly exaggerated. 7.200 men on 4 ships was an immense figure, even if consider that most of them could 
have been slaves. The figure itself came close to that of the troops which Hunyadi had under his command at 
Belgrade (see the studies quoted in note 1 and in particular that of Babinger). On the other hand, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, this figure also tends to increase the credibility of the information, given, for instance, the fact that 
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The plague ravaged the Balkans since the end of spring 1456. It had pushed the 
Ottomans out of Constantinople. According to the ‘overwhelming’ Christian version 
of the events, the plague was also fatal to John Hunyadi. On the other hand, we 
have the Ottoman form of ‘poetic justice’. A ‘lost’ Ottoman arrow would have ended 
John's life. Each version has its strengths and weaknesses. The Ottoman version 
also has the ‘advantage’ of shaping an image of ‘Cid of the Balkans’ for John, as 
the Ottomans did not reattack Belgrade afterwards (but no contemporary seems to 
have made use of this ‘possibility’). Regardless of how we choose to look at these 
depictions of one and the same summer, a unique confrontation between despairs 
arises, even from Ottoman perspective. Like never before or after, Mehmed II forced 
the decisive blow, when the resistance of adversaries could have been patiently and 
surely eroded. Under such circumstances, it is no wonder why Christians claimed that 
the sultan had wanted to commit suicide when he had realized the magnitude of his 
failure or why there was repeated news of the reconquest of Byzantium8.
Aside from the exaggerations of the Franciscans, who tried to make the most out of 
their brother's exploits, from the popular exaltations that aroused Pius II's irony (jealous 
of the glory won by Capestrano), or older or newer millennarist interpretations, 
an almost strange idea of a basically confused redemption emerges from the utopic 
liberation (if we were to draw a parallel, based on political affinities and general attitudes 
towards Greeks, the Genoese ‘would be’ the more tolerant Dominicans, whereas the 
Venetians ‘would be’ the ‘determined’ Franciscans). Slave traders (for this is what 
probably the constant Ottoman garrison of Constantinople consisted of approximately 1.200 men (see also the 
analysis of: Zattoni, Piero. “Le forze militare Ottomane secondo Jacopo de Promontorio”. Bizantinistica. Rivista 
di Studi Bizantini e Slavi, 8 (2006): 305-330, namely pages 309-314). As to Antonio Murino, an intriguing, yet 
virtually unknown, figure, we have to note the fact that he was actively involved, as a recipient and (then) as a 
sender, of the first news on the fall of Byzantium that reached Venice in 1453 (Simon, Alexandru. “Unknown 
Dispacci on the Fall of Byzantium”. Jahrbücher für Österreichische Byzantinistik, 54 (2010), forthcoming; the 
four dispacci containing the, very, fresh news on the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople are preserved in 
the ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Venezia, cart. 340, 1450-1453, fasc. 4, 1453, nn. On the 
other hand, in reference to the events in the 1470s, one other peculiar case should be recalled, maybe as 
intriguing as the ‘Genoese conquest’ of Byzantium. In 1477, after the attempt to defeat Mehmed II in 1476 
had ended with a crusader disaster, leading to renewed major conflicts in the crusader camp and especially 
to threats of withdrawal from it from the main military anti-Ottoman forces in the South-East (Hungary and 
Moldavia), Rome and Venice were in virtually desperate position. Sixtus IV even considered ‘saving the day’ 
by reactivating the Templar Knights in Venice and on Rhodes, which also reveals how limited Rome's means 
were. [Yet another experienced Milanese diplomat, Leonardo Botta, wrote] Che al presente de ordinatione della 
Santita del Papa et del Gran/ Magistro di Rodi [Pierre d’Aubusson] debbeno venire qui a Vinetia a fare capitulo tuti li/ 
Cavalleri del Templo perche voriano che li prosperosi andasseno a habitare/ qualche anni a Rodi et li intabili li desseno 
subsidio pecuniario [...] (ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Venezia, cart. 365, 1477, fasc. 11, 
Novembre, nn; 14th of November 1477; report sent from Venice).
8. In general: Hegedűs, András. “Isten segedelmével a török császárt a fent mondott várból kivetettük: Hunyadi János levele 
Szécsi Dénes esztergomi érsekhez a nándorfehérvári győzelemről”. Magyar Sion, 44/1 (2008) (Translation: Hegedűs, 
András. “With God's Help, with have chased the Turks out of the fortress: John Hunyadi's Letter to Denis 
Szécsi, archbishop of Esztergom, on the Battle of Belgrade”, Magyar Sion, 44/1 (2008): 110-120); Fodor, Pál. 
“The Ottoman Empire, Byzantium and Western Christianity. The Implications of the Siege of Belgrade, 1456”. 
Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 61/1-2 (2008): 43-51; Simon, Alexandru. “Notes on John 
Hunyadi's Actions and Images”. Analele Universităţii Oradea. Istorie, 18 (2009): 35-51 (the main source on 
Hunyadi's ‘alternative death’ remains the altogether very well informed chronicle of Tursun Bey).
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Genoese merchants, with such large vessels, on the road to Crimean Caffa, were in the 
first place) freed the city, resanctified by its punishment of May 1453, from the hands of 
the first primal enemies of Christ. Whether or not the author(s) of the news and those 
who circulated it (until, in fall, the winds of success stopped blowing) saw, willingly or 
unwillingly, such meanings, is a question that can hardly be answered, first of all, due to 
practical reasons dating back to 1456. A few months after the miracle, Hungary entered 
the civil war that Hunyadi would have had to face, had he lived, while the crusader fleet 
in the Mediterranean drowned in piracy and financial dispute9.
3. The Ottoman Conquest of Caffa
In 1471 a pope of Genoese descent took on Saint Peter's succession. Genoese popes, 
like Genoese crusaders, were a rarity. Sixtus IV had neither the ‘genes’, nor the time for 
an all too favorable image. Matters did not improve for him over the next years. Still, 
he continued to try to compensate for them by promoting crusading and humanism. 
Popes before him had usually done the same. Sixtus’ successor's largely upheld the 
pattern, in particular one of his own nephews, the future Jules II. But, by the time 
when Jules took up his cross, his family's Genoese heritage, as well as Genoa's glory, 
seemed to be in the remote past, both in the Italian Peninsula and in the East. In 1475, 
Caffa had fallen. By that time, for more than two decades, Caffa had ceased to be the 
Crimean pride of the republic. It had turned into, more or less, a ‘private enterprise’ ran 
9. Paschini, Pietro. “La flotta di Callisto III, 1455-1458”. Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria, 53-
55 (1930-1932): 177-254; Marinescu, Constantin. “Le Pape Calixtus III (1455-1458), Alfonse d’Aragon, 
roi de Naples, et l’offensive contre les Turcs”. Bulletin de la Section Historique de l’Académie Roumaine, 19 
(1935): 77-97; Delacroix, Claudine. Les Dominicains et la Chrétienté grecque aux XIVe et XVe siècles. Rome: École 
française de Rome, 1997; Millar, Bonnie. “Sanctity, Savagery and Saracens in Capystranus: Fifteenth Century 
Christian-Ottoman Relations”. Al Masaq, 14/2 (2002): 113-121; Damian, I.M. “Fonti e ideologia della ‘crociata 
dei minori’”, Between Worlds...: II, 447-462; Simon, Alexandru. “Milanese Perspectives on the Hungarian Events 
of 1456”, Miscel·lanea Historica et Archaeologica in Honorem Professoris Ionel Cândea, Valeriu Sârbu, Cristian Luca, 
eds. Brăila: Muzeul Brăilei-Editura Istros, 2009: 249-260 (the start of the civil war). In these crusader and 
Hungarian matters, the following passages, drawn from Milanese reports sent from Vienna and Buda, are 
quite relevant: Qua se dice ch’el Conte de Cile [Ulrich von Cilly] e morto et che lo figliolo della bona memoria de 
Johannes/ Uniad [Ladislas (László) Hunyadi] lo habbia amazato sotto pretexto ch’el dicto conte de Cile voleva amazare/ 
luy. E questo e stato in Ungheria. E alchuni pensano male del stato del Re de Ungaria/ perche dicto Conte de Cile faceva 
fare al dicto Re [Ladislas V] su e giu come voleva/ luy. I Ungari sono infideli e imbecilli e inconstanti homini verso li loro 
Signori/ e maxime <verso> li Principi, et se dice etiam che tutti li consiglieri e grandi maestri/ ch’erano con el Conte de Cile 
siano presi e sostenuti, et che tucta la robba/ a havere con si el dicto Conte de Cile sia stata saccomanata. Et in queste/ parte 
ognuno se alegra della morte del dicto Conte de Cile, e qua communiter/ se dice ch’era cason de questa guerra che se faceva 
al imperatore [Frederick III] e ch’era uno/ tiranno che voleva guastare e mettere male usanze e graveze in tucta Alemagna 
[...] // [Likewise] Io ho voluto sentire della sconfita di Turchi [i.e. the battle of Belgrade] e trovo per tre o quattro 
persone con/ che ho parlato quale se sonno personaliter ritrovate in quella guerra, e chi de loro/ so serito, e chi strupiato de 
schioperti in quella guerra e sconfitta. E dicono/ che li Turchi hanno havuto poca rotta e che se ritrovano XXXXm morti, 
tanti/ Christiani che li Turchi, e che lo magior danno che habbiano havuto Turchi e/ la perdita della munitione e della 
armata d’aqua. E dicese che lo Turcho fa/ magior apparato ad guerra che may e ch’el fa come fa lo lione quando e/ humilato 
(ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Germania, cart. 569, fasc. 7, nn, 31 decembrie 1456, Wiener 
Neustadt; the report by Giovanni de Ulesis, Francesco Sforza's experienced diplomat).
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by the Bank of San Giorgio, the true, the most constant at least, ruler of Genoa in those 
decades10.
The peak of crusader attention given to the Black Sea had been in the final hours 
of Byzantium (1452-1453). Later Roman, Venetian or Genoese Pontic plans were less 
energetic. Uzun Hassan's rise, the Venetian rediscovery of the Russian and Tartar anti-
Ottoman reservoirs, as well as Venice's own anti-Ottoman misery, brought the area 
back to major crusader attention (1472-1474). The Bohemian involvement of John 
Hunyadi's royal son, Matthias Corvinus, the main figure on Christendom's Ottoman 
border, had also pushed this attention eastwards. His political return to the south, 
largely made possible by Mehmed II's eagerness to teach him a lesson at home for 
his mingeling in the Porte's Walachian affairs, was accompanied by Stephen III of 
Moldavia's anti-Ottoman rise (1474-1475). But, not others followed. When Caffa fell, 
only two states were in fact at war with the Turk (Rome was ‘still’, by definition, forever 
at war with the Turk): Hungary and namely Moldavia. Not even Genoa was at war 
with the Porte, whereas Venice had concluded in March 1475 a six month truce with 
the empire11.
10. See, in this context, in particular: Baletto, Laura. “Sisto IV e Gem Sultano”, L’eta dei Della Rovere. Atti del 
Convegno, Savona, 7-10 novembre 1985. Atti e Memorie della Società Savonese di Storia Patria. Savona: Società savonese 
di storia patria, 1988: II, 153-170; Martignone, Franco. “L’orazione di Ladislao Vetesy per l’obbedienza di 
Mattia d’Ungheria a Sisto IV”, L’eta dei Della Rovere. Atti del Convegno, Savona...: 205-249; Matschke, Klaus-
Peter. “Der Fall von Konstantinopel in den Rechnungsbüchern der genuesischen Staatschuldenverwaltung”, 
ΠΟΛΥΥΠΛΕΥΡΟΣ ΝΟΥΣ. Miscellanea für Peter Schreiner zu seinem 60. Geburtstag, Cordula Scholz, Peter Makris, 
eds. Munich-Leipzig: K. G. Saur, 2000: 204-220; Kolditz, Sebastian. “Mailand und das Despotat Morea nach 
dem Fall von Konstantinopel”, Geschehenes und Geschriebenes. Studien zu Ehren von Günther S. Henrich und Klaus 
Peter Matschke, Sebastien Kolditz, Ralf Müller, Klaus-Peter Matschke, Günter S. Henrich, eds. Leipzig: 2005: 
367-407; Papacostea, Şerban. La Mer Noire carrefour des grandes routes intercontinentales 1204-1453. Bucharest: 
Institutul Cultural Român, 2006. For the conquest of Caffa: Babinger, Franz. “Die Aufzeichnungen des 
Genuesen Iacopo de Promontorio de Campris über den Osmanenstaat um 1475”. Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 8/9 (1957): 24-31; Cazacu, Matei ; Kévonian, Keram. “La chute de Caffa en 1475 
à la lumière de nouveaux documents”. Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 17/4 (1976): 495-538 (Caffa was 
the largest city north-east of both Istanbul and Venice, with a population of approximately 70.000; Baletto, 
Laura. “Caffa 1467”, Genova, Mediterraneo, Mar Nero (secc. XIII-XV). Genoa: Civico Istituto Colombiano, 1976: 
269-290. In this context, we recall what seems to be one of the most eloquent samples of Chris-tian collective 
hope and individual survival, at the same time, in that period: [...] L’armata del Turcho e intrata in Mare Magiore 
alla via de Capha/ per questo anno siamo liberati da terrore. Esso sta in persona a/ Constantinopoli, et questo anno non ha 
a moverse, potra forse mandare/ el suo bassa de Romania cum lo exercito a la via de Moldavia/ per cerchar de vindicarsi del 
dampno et iniuria quale el/ dicto bassa have questo zenario in dicti parti di Moldavia [in example the battle of Vaslui, 
10th of January 1475], che li/ fuorono tagliati in peze piu de 30m Turchi, che s’el andara, prego/ Dio la secunda cavalchata 
corresponda ala prima [...] (ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Turchia-Levante, cart. 647, fasc. 1, 
Albania, nn; 29th of May 1475; report sent from Ragusa to Venetian authorities and copied for the chancery of 
the Milanese duchy).
11. For a selection of sources and analysis: Archivio Segreto Vaticano (ASV), Armadi (Arm.), XXXIX-7, 
f. 83r-83v (4th of April 1457); XXXIX-10, f. 127 (128)r [document issued after the 16th of April 1472]; 
Miscellanea, Armadi (Misc., Arm.), II-7, ff. 387 (391)v-390 (394)r, 469 (473)r-473 (477)r (6th of May and 13th 
of July 1472); II-30, f. 33 (38)r (30th of May 1472); II-56, f. 225 (235)v (6th of August 1475); “Acta Vladislao 
Jagellonide Regnante”. Fontes Rerum Polonicarum e tabulario reipublicae Venetae, ed. August Cieszkowski. Poznań: 
Typis Officinae Dziennik Poznański, 1890: I-2, 131-150 (doc. nº 53-64); Bogdan, Ioan. Documentele lui 
Ştefan cel Mare. Bucharest: Socec & Co. 1913: II, 319-347 (doc. nº 143-156); Cronaca di Anonimo Veronese 1446-
1488, ed. Giovanni Soranzo. Venice: A spese della Società, 1915: 307; Mehmet, Mustafa A. “La politique 
ottomane à l’égard de la Moldavie et du Khanat de Crimée vers la fin du règne du sultan Mehmed II ‘le 
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Towards the end of the year, the ‘crusader’ tension reached a high level not 
touched since the fall of Negroponte (1470-1471) or even Pius II's final years 
(1463-1464). Sixtus IV tried to offer the best response possible to Caffa's fall. 
The Genoese however provided however a much weaker response. Their actual 
response came in fact much later, following the Ottoman conquest and the ‘holy 
recovery’ of Ortanto (1480-1481). In spring 1475, several Genoese officials, not 
only from the Crimea, viewed the fall of Caffa as inevitable. Like other Italian 
politicians they seemed unimpressed by the recent Ottoman defeat in Moldavia 
that Venice and Buda tried to present as one of the greatest defeats in Ottoman 
history. If they accepted the news on the battle and on its magnitude, they were 
generally fright tened by what was to come. Still, Genoese defensive precautions 
were limited, almost formal. After Caffa's conquest, it seemed that for some the 
Conquerant’”. Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, 13/3 (1974) : 512-515. Venice would have turned the truce of spring 
1475 into a peace, if in October, the same year, Mehmed II's demands would have been smaller. Buda and 
Suceava too had attempted in (late) spring 1475 to reach arrangements with the sultan. But in particular in 
relation to Stephen III (who, officially, only became the vassal of Matthias Corvinus, a month after the fall of 
Caffa), the sultan was not willing to accept any compromise, only full submission. Impulsive and seemingly 
over-confident alike, Mehmed II pushed for more in autumn, to the horror of the West (at that time, the Tartar 
fights had divided the Tartar power into two, into the Golden and Great Horde, and consequently influenced 
pro- and, namely, anti-Ottoman conduct in Tartar lands, but still, at that time, did not pose a major problem 
in the East to the sultan, who had asserted his dominance and created an Ottoman-Tartar power center, by 
compelling khan Mengli Ghiray, very eager otherwise to secure a large portion of the Genoese heritage in 
the Crimea to join the Ottomans at the siege of Caffa). In the end it should however be remembered that the 
Christian impact of the fall of Caffa was compared to that of Constantinople and that, had the sultan's health 
been in better condition, he could have conquered the other old Genoese colonies in the Black Sea area in that 
summer. For a selection: [...] Questa hora XV la Signoria per uno suo secretario me ha mandato/ ad monstrare doe lettere 
de di ultimo del passato che eadem hora dice havere recevute per/ uno correro ad posto del suo ambassatore de Ungaria, per una 
delli quali li significa/ una pessima novella, videlicet ch’el Re de Ungaria [Matthias Corvinus] e stato advisato dal Vaiuoda/ 
Valacho [Stephen III of Moldavia], como l’armata del Turcho ha debellato et preso Caffa con tute le forteze/ et ha tagliato 
a peze tuti li italiani, et principali del dicto loco, como piu diffisamente/ per la copia della dicta lettera, la quale mando qui 
inclusa Vestra Sublimita vedera. Questa/ perdita de Caf-fa secundo me ha dicto el prefato secretario dicta Signoria la risposta/ 
importantis-sima et periculosissima ad Cristiani, per la intelligentia seguita tra Turchi et Tartari, in Dio permetti quello sia per 
il meglio [...] (14th of July; report from Venice) [...] Ello ha acquistato duo sedia, per uno de soy figlioli, che e de maiore 
botta la/ perdita di Caffa a Christiani, che non fu quella de Constantinopole quod spachieva/ tutto quello cantone et forno che 
habilitater potero corerre fin in gaudro, poy che ello/ ho prexo Caffa, ello ho prexo tutta la Signoria di Gotia [the Principality 
of Thedoro], che sono Greci, solius/ in resto uno castello nominato Teodoro, al quali sono a campo tutti, non e apicato/ al ello, 
sed alla fine lo prendera per asedio. La sua armata adhuc e in quelle/ parte, noy eraviamo de opinione, che la dicta armata 
dovesse andare a Mocastro [Moncastro/ Maurocastro/ Cetatea Albă, at the Dniestr Mounds, the old Genoese colony 
under Moldavian control], lo/ terra maestra alle marine del Velacho, no a qui non gli e andato et sub/ opinione per questo 
anno non la andara. Io mi credo che la peste grande che e in/ Turchia et in Grecia et maxime in Constantinopole, che in dicto 
loco li morano lo/ forno ottocento li habia rotto delli desegni assay per questo anno [...]// La persona sua e in Adrianopole, con 
grande oste, dicano octantamillia, era per / intrare in Velachia, fin a qui non lo ha facto, ne se estime lo debia fare [...] (18th of 
August; report from Rhodes). [...] Hogi è gionto la nave Salvaga, che se è partita un mese fa da Chio./ Alarano Salvagio, 
patrono d’essa, dice che la si haveva per certa la perdita/ de Caffa, et che fuo presa senza altra defensione quamprimum gli 
gionse/ l’armata dil Turcho, laquale non si era ancora partita da quelle parte/ dil Mare Maore et ch’esso Turcho si era reducto 
in Andrinopoli cum/ XXX mille homini, per timore della peste chi è in Constantinopoli et che haveva/ saputo dil paramento 
faceva il Valacho [Stephen III] et Ungano [Matthias Corvinus] (25th of September; report from Genoa). ASM, 
Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Genova, cart. 691, 1475 Agosto-Settembre, fasc. 2, Settembre, nn (25th 
of September); Turchia-Levante, cart. 647, fasc. 2 (18th of August); Venezia, cart. 361, fasc. 6, Giugno, nn; fasc. 7, 
Luglio, nn (14th of July).
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fall had been in fact a mean of cutting lose, with the sultan's hands, a costly 
appendix that had outlived its usefulness. No unholy recovery followed12.
4. The Ottoman End to a Crusader Dream
In the summer of 1484, the Ottoman Empire conquered the last major free 
Christian harbors in the Black Sea area and Bayezid II saved his reign. Within less than 
a month, Bayezid II conquered Moldavia's entire maritime façade, which at the time 
stretched apparently beyond the Dniestr Mounds. Later Ottoman-Moldavian talks and 
12. In this respect: Archivio di Stato di Genova (ASG), Genoa, Archivio Segreto, Diversorum Communis Januae, 
3056, 1475, nn (21st of January 1474, 13th, 18th of Fe-bruary, 27th of March, 18th of December 1475); Sezione 
Manoscritti, Mss. 849, Caffa: Estratti dall’Archivio di San Giorgio, no. 115 [April 1475]; Gali, Antonio. Commentarii 
de rebus Genuensium et de navigatione Columbi. 1466-1494, ed. Emilio Pandiani. Città di Castello: S. Lapi, 1910: 
60-64; 68-69; 71-72; Neri, Archille. “Lettera di Laudivio da Vezzano sulla caduta di Caffa”. Giornale linguistico 
di scienze, lettere ed arti, 2 (1875): 137-153; Balard, Michel. “Caffa ‘Ianuensis civitas in extremo Europe’”. Rivista 
di Bizantinistica, 3 (1993): 165-182; Pistarino, Geo; Tacchella, Lorenzo. Tre cabellesi consoli di Genova in Crimea 
nel secolo XV. Giovanni Renzi da Cabella, Barnaba da Cabella e Antoniotto da Cabella. La caduta di Caffa (Teodosia) nel 
1475. Milano: Biblioteca dell’Accademia Olubrense, 2001. As an example for the Ottoman crusader pressure 
in that time, if we add together only the reports in the Roma and Venezia series of the Ducal Archives of 
Milan, let alone the data in the ‘oriental’ departments, there was virtually no day, for up to 15-16 months 
(August/October 1475-November/ December 1476), without one (at times even three) reports on crusader 
talks or on (anti-/ pro-) Ottoman activity. The tension remained at that level for almost a year until it became 
clear for many that the anti-Ottoman (short term) successes in Serbia and Walachia could not compensate 
for the failure in Moldavia (the land was ravaged by Mehmed II, who, however could not take any major 
city, but the main crusader aim had been not to repell Mehmed, but to trap and defeat him between the 
armies of Moldavia and of Hungary, from the West). Mehmed was still standing. The ‘anti-Ottoman energy’ 
redropped to its level of mid 1475. Italian affairs moved along. In 1475, Rome and Milan had been concerned, 
like Florence, each for its own purposes, that the fall of Caffa virtually left Venice, and then Naples, as the 
only real Italian seapowers to the East. Furthermore, no Genoese crusader energy, anger, or fear was to 
surface in the manner of 1453/1454-1456 (which seems rather explainable under the circumstances). Besides, 
propaganda aside, there seemed to be no hero, like Hunyadi, to fuel and capture responses. His second (the 
first one was Skanderbeg) successor as an athlete of Rome, Stephen III of Moldavia made a very handsome 
profit in trading Caffese captives and goods, a profit that could have been as high as two thirds of the yearly 
papal budget at that time; Item, per molte altre littere de persone privar de Levante, se intende el dictoTurco essere/ molto 
indignato et incrudelito verso Genuesi et la casone de tale indignatione afferiscono/ essere perche una nave genuese, chiamata 
la Nigrona, piu di sono caricho in Caffa/ robe de Turchi de valuta circha ducentomilla ducati et alcuni puti che erano/ 
mandati al dicto Turcho. Et post alle vele per venire ad Constantinopoli mutato/ consilio, parue al patrone d’essa che le richeze 
et il tempo li fusse molto comodo ad/ fare uno bono quadagona. Et cosi presi et morti tuti li Turchi erano sopra dicta/ nave. Se 
adrizo alla volta del Danubio et ando con tute queste faculta ad trovare il/ Vayvoda Steffano, et con esso divise la roba a suo 
modo. Per la quale violenta/ animosita scriveno el Turco indignato havere facto incarcerare tuti li Genuesi/ erano in Pera, in 
Metelino et nelli altri lochi circumstanti, et toltolli tute le loro/ faculta, et havere deliberato vedre il firie di Syo. Che se queste 
cosa fusseno della / natura se scrivero veramente Genuesi seriano in una miserissima exterminatione./ Et etiam sono alcune 
altre litere che dicono esso Turcho eodem modo haver facto/ incarcerare tuti li Franchi, videlicet tuti li Cristiani, erano in Pera 
et in quelli lochi/ circumstanti. Tamen queste ultime novelle non se hanno de lochi ben auctentii (ASM, Archivio Ducale 
Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Venezia, cart. 365, fasc. 5, Maggio, nn; 11th of May 1477; report by Leonordo Botta; 
in these matters, see further: Andreescu, Ştefan. “Autour de la dernière phase des rapports entre la Moldavia 
et Gênes”. Revue Roumaine d’Histoire, 21/2 (1982) : 257-282; Baczkowski, Kryzstof. “Nieznane listy Baltazara 
z Piscii do papieża Sykstusa IV z lat 1476-1478 ze zbiorów weneckich”. Prace Historyczne, 89 (1989): 242-248, 
app. nº1; Pienaru, Naghi. “Un document otoman necunoscut din 1476”. Revistă Istorică, 13/1-2 (2002): 229-241.
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arrangements namely those of 1486 and 1501-1503, failed to significantly change the 
situation in Moldavia's favor. Stephen III no longer held the keys to Hungary (Chilia) 
and Poland (Cetatea Albă), as the two most important former Genoese colonies under 
Moldavian control were viewed at that time. Poland and Hungary too had failed to 
render any efficient aid. The events were an embarrassment for the Christian powers 
with interests in the region. The ‘weakling’ Bayezid was neither dethroned nor (at least) 
halted. Still, Bayezid did not over emphasize matters not even when, in early August, he 
hurried to announce his victory to both his subjects and his neighbors. This was not so 
much a question of balanced tactics, but of methods of conquest, contrary to his desired 
image13.
13. For an overview: “‘Historia politica constantinopoleos a 1391 usque ad 1578 annum Christi’”, Historia Politica 
et Patriarchica Constantinopoleos. Epirotica, Immanuel Bekker, ed. Bonn: Impensis Ed. Weberi, 1849: 54; “Aus der 
Chronik des Oruç, Aus dem Anonymus Hanivaldanus”, Der fromme Sultan Bayezid. Die Geschichte seiner Herrschaft 
(1481-1512) nach den altos manischen Chroniken des Oruç und des Anonymus Hanivaldanus, Richard F. Kreutel, ed. 
Graz-Vienna-Cologne: Styria, 1978: 43-44; 212-215; Cristea, Ovidiu. “Campania din 1484 în lumina unor noi 
mărturii veneţiene”, Ştefan cel Mare şi Sfânt: Atlet al credinţei creştine, Ştefan Sorin Gorovei, Maria Magdalena 
Székely, eds. Putna: Muşatinii, 2004: 187-274; Maxim, Mihai. “Stephen the Great and the Sublime Porte: New 
Turkish Documents”. Transylvanian Review, 14/1 (2005): 19-21. The following pages largely draw on our study: 
Simon, Alexandru. “The Contested Sultan: The Backgrounds of Bayezid II's Moldavian Campaign of 1484”. 
Eurasian Studies: Journal for Balkan, Eastern Mediterranean, Anatolian, Middle Eastern, Iranian and Central Asian Studies, 
7 (2009): 17-50. In late spring 1484, Venice, Naples, Rhodes, Buda and Suceava felt (equally) threatened by 
Ottoman war preparations. To different degrees, their fears were justified. Eventually, Moldavia, the harbors 
under her control, was the target of the attack. In fact, she had been the Porte's cible since the beginning of the 
year. In spite of his costly power displays, Bayezid II was unwilling, at the time, to risk an open confrontation with 
a Latin rite power. Faced with major foreign and domestic troubles, the sultan had been compelled to promise 
a highly profitable campaign for all those which would have followed Bayezid on his endeavor. In particular, 
the Janissaries, which had rebelled against him in the winter of 1483-1484, were asking for money and, at the 
same time, for a proof of the sultan's military abilities, for he was the son of Mehmed II (Bayezid's brother and 
rival Djem had taken refuge with the Knights Hospitallers and was still very popular in the Ottoman Empire). 
The unique privileges issued by Bayezid II on the occasion of his ‘sudden’ Moldavian campaign of 1484 also 
show that the campaign was a matter of survival. Eventually in that summer, Bayezid II conquered from 
Stephen III of Moldavia around 6 harbors (Chilia, Licostomo, Cetatea Albă, ‘Czernigrad’, ‘Sevastople’, Ilice and 
thus half of the urban population of medieval Moldavia. For a time, Stephen III seems to have lost his capital 
city of Suceava too. The Christian failures were largely the result of the fact that, on military and diplomatic soil, 
Stephen III (influenced also by Sixtus IV attempts to relaunch the crusade in the East in order to escape the 
Italian pressure the pope was under) and Matthias Corvinus (caught in his conflict with emperor Frederick III 
of Habsburg) underestimated the sultan, who, nevertheless, was in a seemingly impossible situ-ation. In this 
respect, we recall a rather eloquent eastern report that reached Milan via Naples prior to the fall of the habors: 
[...] Delle cose del Turco: aviso la Vostra Excellentia noviter essere venuto di Constantinopoli/ uno nepuote del conte camer-
lengo, che referisse essere partito da Constantinopoli trenta giorni fa, et lo Grande Turco essere levato da dicta cita per andare 
ad campersi contra/ lo Signor di Valachia, et questo per che era stato tre anni che non haveva pagato lo censo de/ cer-te castelle 
che tene censuario nomine da sua Signoria, et havendogli mandato ad offerire/ di pagarli di presente, lo ha recusato, con dire 
che vole le castelle, et ch’el prefato Signor di Valachia hagli risposto che le castelle non sono sue, ma sono del serenissimo Re di 
Ungaria. Questo/ medessimo etiam se affirma per lettere de Ragusei del primo del presente, per le quale refferiscono/ esse Gran 
Turco havere misso nel Mar Magiore centocinquanta velle per volere debellare/ questo Signor di Vala-chia, dicendo che questa 
armata l’haveva instructa ad effecto di/ mandarla parte in Puglia ad instantia di Venetiani, et parte contra Rodiani, perche 
gli era significato suo fratello [Djem] essere morto. Et che essendoli persuaso da uno grande/ maestro suo assistente de drizare 
questa armata contra lo Signor di Valachia haveva/ mutata sententia, et sequito il suo consiglio facilitando questa impressa, 
et persuadendoli/ <verso> [...]ta puoi poteria venire alla impresa di qua. Narrando apresso/ [...] Re di Ungaria havere 
mandati li soi ambasciatori per/ [...] pace et havere nominato in essi capituli per adherente lo dicto Signore/ [...] non haverli 
voluto consentire ne acceptare la pace; parendoci/ [...]gnosa cossa havere facto tante apparato contra esso Signore per ritrarsi 
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Stephen III had come to the rescue of Chilia and was crushed outside the 
city. All Moldavian survivors were executed at the city gates, which fell shortly 
after, if it had not fallen prior to the clash. These executions shocked Cetatea 
Albă. She surrendered almost immediately after Bayezid set foot in front of 
her. The Ottoman sources kept perfect silence on the less than heroic actions. 
Venice recorded what had actually occurred. Yet, she did not remind the sultan 
of them, but greeted his envoy with the news of his master's victory. Regardless 
of their rite, for motifs that stretched from personal shame to collective failure, 
Christians played along. As time went by, the duration of the sieges was 
prolonged, up to a month in later Ottoman sources. Back in Chilia, Bayezid II 
had announced his complete victory to Ragusa. He soon realized that his victory 
could be detrimental to him, if he did not provide an alternative perspective 
of what had happened in July and in previous months as well, when his rule 
had been severly threatened. Other examples of such Christian acceptance of a 
Muslim story are hard to find14. 
puoi/ [...], et per questo lo prefato Re di Ungaria li haveva ma dato/ [...] uno valoroso capitaneo con grande copia di gente per 
aiutarlo. Et che esso/ [...] sera munito et fortificato talmente che non temeva lo advento suo/ [...]evasi anchora in dicte lettere 
che la gentedarme del prefato Signore Gran Turco/ era malcontenta da la sua Signoria et che universalmente desideravano 
lo fratello/ confortaria essi Ragosei la sua Maiesta di havere esso fratello nelle mano/ per secureza dello stato suo et di tutta la 
Christianità, significandoli ch’el/ prefato Signor Gran Turco haveva preso gran sdigno ad emulatione che Venetiani/ havessero 
preso Galipoli, et intrati in questo reame [...] (ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze Estere, Napoli, cart. 244, 
fasc. 2, nn (9th of July; highly damaged report, authored by Milan's able spy Branda di Castilono; the Venetians 
however had not taken Galipoli, but, as fearful of preserving the peace with the Empire and as anexious of even 
regaining, by the sultan's goodwill, some of the possessions lost during the war of 1463-1479, as they were, the 
Venetians had to take into account the possibility of the collapse of Bayezid II's reign, case in which the republic 
had to avoid being ‘caught’ of the Ottoman sultan's side).
14. Archivio di Stato di Venezia (ASV), Senato Secreti, Deliberazioni, reg. 32, 1484-1485, c. 92r (16th of 
September 1484); Dispacci Constantinopoli, F[ilza], 1A, 1484-1567, Dispacci al Senato del Segretario Giovanni Dario, 
1484,31 maggio 28 febbrario mv [1485], no. 24a (5th of August 1484; edition: 22 Dispacci da Constantinopoli al 
doge Giovanni Mocenigo, ed. Giuseppe Calo. Venice: Corbo e Fiore, 1992: 82 (doc. nº 24a); Makusev, Viaceslav. 
Monumenta Historica Slavorum Meridionalium vicinorumque populorum e tabularis et bibliothecis italicis derompta. I-1. 
Ancona-Bononia-Florentia. Warsaw: typis Districtu Sscholastici Varsaviensis, 1874: 554 (doc. nº 9); Monumenta 
Historica Slavorum Meridionalium vicinorumque populorum e tabularis et bibliothecis italicis derompta. I-2. Genua, Mantua, 
Mediolanum, Panormus et Taurinum. Belgrade: Typographia Regni Serbiae, 1882: 134 (doc. nº 14); Nagy, Iván; 
Nyáry, Albert B. Magyar diplomacziai emlékek. Mátyás király korából 1458-1490. Budapest : A M. Tud. Akadémia, 
1875-1878: 36-37 (doc. nº 33) (2nd of August 1484; a copy from the 24th of December, 1484, of Bayezid II's 
letter to the city of Ragusa was preserved also in: ASM, Archivio Ducale Sforzesco, Potenze estere, Illiria, 
Polonia, Russia, Slavonia, cart. 640 [1450-1531], fasc. [1], Illiria, nn); Antalffy, Andrei. “Două documente din 
biblioteca egipteană de la Cairo”. Revista Istorică, 20/1-3 (1934): 38-40; Sanudo, Marino. Le vite dei dogi (1474-1494), 
ed. Angela Caracciolo. Padua: Antenore, 1989-2001): 472, 476-477 (based on the same manuscript in the 
Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana in Venice, the data on the fall of harbors was edited prior to the Italian edition 
of the chronicle in Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki: Documente privitoare la istoria românilor, ed. Ioan Slavici. Bucharest: 
Academia Româna şi Ministerul Cultelor si̧ Instrucţiunii Publice 1894: VIII 27-28 (docs. nº 29-30); Bogdan, 
Damian P. “Ştiri despre români în cronici publicate la Moscova”. Revista Arhivelor, 54/4 (1977): 443-446 (Stephen 
III lost however far more than the 200 men, claimed by a contemporary anonymous (Russian) Lithuanian 
chronicle). [Extracts from Marino Sanudo's Vite dei dogi regarding the events of 1484]. In questo tempo [prior 
to the 5th of September 1484] per uno grippo venuto da Corphù con lettere di Sier Piero Bembo <figlio> quondam sier 
Lorenzo, Baylo nostro a Con-stantinopoli, et di Zuan Dario, Secretario nostro [these letters or other letters on the fall 
of the Moldavian harbors had been sent from Istanbul to Venice already on August 5 and 6], se intese come il 
signor Payseta turcho [Bayezid II], che andò nel pa-exe dil Valacho di [passage missing from the manuscript in the 
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After Stephen III's first failed attempt to retake Cetatea Albă, the councillors of 
Ferdinand of Aragon, knew for a fact that one of the harbors lost during the previous 
summer had been reconquered by Stephen III in early 1485. It was not true. A year 
later, in Pskov, in the remote Muscovite lands, monks wrote that Matthias Corvinus 
and Stephen III, Moscow's allies, and Casimir IV Jagiello of Poland and the Teutons, 
Moscow's enemies, had retaken the harbors and rode towards Istanbul (1486). Such 
a dream of liberating even Constantinople had not arisen after Stephen's celebrated 
anti-Ottoman victory of 1475. Disaster made it possible. Apparently, immediately after 
receiving news on the Ottoman triumph of July 1484, Sixtus IV, much weakened by 
his defeat in the war with Venice, had died. His successor, Innocent VIII proclaimed the 
crusade15. 
Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana; probably the missing passage of text of the chronicle read either Carabodan or 
Moldavia], havia preso la terra fortissima chiamata Nicostomo, et roto 25m cavalli de’ coradori di ditto Valacho, per il che li 
custodi et habitatori di Moncastro [the Genoese name of Cetatea Albă], vedendo la crudeltà dil Turcho fata a Nicostomo 
[in example Licostomo; the Genoese name(s) for Chilia and the urban settlements in her vicinity] li mandoe le 
chiave di ditta cità, et senza altra bataglia avé quel Dominio [inspite of Suceava's efforts to increase her control over the 
southern harbors, these cities still enjoyed a very large authonomy as a particular ‘domain’ within Moldavia's 
statal sphere]. [...]. A dì 18 [September 1484] dil dito mexe arivoe in questa cità uno ambasador dil signor Bayseto, 
Principe d’ i Turchi. El qual fo honorato iusta el solito, et venuto in Colegio apresentoe la lettera dil suo Signor, che avisava la 
vitoria auta e l’aquisto di le terre dil Valacho, et che, come nostro bon amico, mandava ad alegrarsi di la sua vittoria. Poi esso 
orator, qual havia inzegno, havendo per camin inteso di la paxe fata, si congratulò col Principe, dicendo il suo Signor l’averà 
molto a grato ad intender tal nova, per la bona amicitia e paxe ’l ha con questa Signoria. Et, stato dito orator qui alcuni zorni, 
fo risposto a la lettera dil Signor ralegrandosi di tal vitoria; et lui fo vestito et la soa fameglia, et apresentato; poi se partì molto 
contento // Ma pocho dapoi, se intese esso Signor Turcho havia auto una rota di molta di la soa gente da Hongari et Croati adunati 
insieme con le zente dil Valacho, lì in Valachia. Per il che, di novo esso Signor feva exercito per andar im persona contra di questi. 
15. Rinaldo, Odorico. Annales ecclesiastici ab anno MCXCVIII ubi desinit Cardinalis Baronibus auctore Odorico Raynaldo 
accedunt. Colony, 1693: XIX, 345b-346a (doc. nº 64-68); 346b (doc. nº 71); 349b-350a (doc. nº 3-5); Correspondenze 
degli ambasciatori fiorentini. Corrispondenza di Giovanni Lanfredini (maggio 1485-ottobre 1486), ed. Elisabetta Scarton. 
Salerno: Carlone, 2002: II, 140-141; Panaitescu, P. P. “Ştefan cel Mare în lumina cronicarilor contemporani 
din ţările vecine”. Studii şi cercetări ştiinţifice. Istorie, 11/2, (1960): 219-220 (the chronicle from Pskov). Through 
the offices of Sixtus IV (at that time, unlike in 1484, one of the greatest supporters of both Matthias Corvinus 
and Ferdinand of Aragon), the king of Hungary had married the daughter of the king of Naples, Beatrice, 
in 1476, whereas, in 1483, the daughter of Stephen III, Helena, had married the son and heir, Ivan, of Ivan 
III of Moscow, with the blessing of Matthias Corvinus, Stephen's suzerain, thus securing the long desi-red 
Hungarian-Moldavian-Muscovite alliance against Poland-Lithuania. The first attempts for this alliance had 
been made soon after the fall of Caffa (usually an adversary of both Ivan III and Stephen III), when Stephen III 
had written a most passionate letter to Ivan III, urging the latter, in the name of their common Eastern rite, to 
join forces against the Ottomans and the Tartars who had just conqured the Crimean metropolis. As he had 
done in 1472-1473, just after his marriage to Zoe Palaeologus (the cousin of Stephen III's second wife, Mary of 
Theodoro, whom he had married in 1472 too), and as he would do in 1484-1485, Ivan III nonetheless kept his 
distance from the Ottoman front, though by marriage as well (his wife, Stephen III's wife and Usun Hassan 
wife, Helena Cantacuzenos, were, for instance, all three the nieces of cardinal Bessarion, Venice's favorite and 
the Greek spearhead of papal crusading against the Ottomans), he had strong connections to the anti-Ottoman 
camp. In 1486, when Casimir IV of Poland (who had reluctantly agreed to aid Stephen against Bayezid II, after 
Matthias had failed to significantly aid the Moldavian ruler) asked Ivan III to come to Stephen III's aid, the 
Muscovite grand-knjaz responded that Stephen's neighbors have the Christian duty to help him, for he, Ivan, 
cannot do that, though he wants to, because Moscow is too far away from the southern battlefields (Relaţiile 
istorice dintre popoarele URSS şi România în veacurile XV-începutul celui de al XVIII-lea. Bucharest-Moscow: Nauka, 
1966: I, 64 (nº 10)). In this respect, given also the general Russian, in particular, reaction to the Church Union 
and crusading after 1439 (the Union of Florence) 1448 (the official Muscovite rejection of the union), the chronicle 
of Pskov, its lines referening to the year 1486, illustrate a quite rare Orthodox stand towards anti-Ottoman warfare. 
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The former Genoese colonies at the Dniestr and Danube Mounds (better known 
however as the Habors of the Hungarian to Byzantines and Ottomans alike) did not 
return into Christian hands, though rumors of their recovery still arose from time to 
time16.
16. For the harbors of the Hungarian, in reference to the Genoese colonies under Moldavia's (very disputed) control 
since the 1380s, see for instance: Fontes Historiae Daco-Romanae, IV, Scriitori şi acte bizantine, secolele IV-XV, Horaţiu 
Mihăilescu, Radu Lăzărescu, Nicolae-Şerban Tana-şoca, Tudor Teoteoi, eds. Bucharest: Editura Academiei 
republicii socialiste România, 1982: 560-562 (doc. nº LXXII-5, 6, 7); 567 (doc. nº LXXIII (Manolis Sclavos)). 
In December 1485, Cetatea Albă was also named dy Deuthsche Weysenburgk, like the other fames White Castle of 
the age (Nandorlaba/ Belgrade) was named the Greek White Castle/ Griechische Weissenburg. Acta statuum terrarum 
Prussiae regalis, ed. Karol Górski, Marian Biskup. Toru: Societas Scientiarum Torunensis, 1955: I, 392 (doc. nº 
212). The ‘Hungarian status’ of the harbors went probably back to John Hunyadi's time. However, unlike Chilia, 
retaken from under Walachian-Ottoman control by Stephen III of Moldavia, with Matthias Corvinus’ approval in 
1465, Cetatea Albă had never housed a Hungarian garrison. It is possible that John Hunyadi requested Cetatea 
Albă, in order to aid Byzantium (and his interests), from Alexander II of Moldavia, most likely, in parallel with 
his request (eventually granted by the Byzantine emperor) for Messembria, made to Constantine XI Palaeologus 
in 1452-1453. In early 1448, Peter II of Moldavia had been forced by Hunyadi to surrender Chilia to the governor 
of Hungary who installed a Hungarian garrison in the harbor (the garrison was driven out in late 1464, while 
king Matthias Corvinus was on his second Bosnian campaign and the inhabitans of the city viewed the garrison 
as detrimental to their commercial interests that ran through the Ottoman Empire). The probably best known 
rumor of a recovery of the harbors lost in 1484 dates from 1497. Jan Albert of Poland left for his crusade against 
the Ottomans (the only crusade not officially sanctioned by the papacy in the late 1400s, even though pope 
Alexander VI thought it wise to approve the raise of funds for it in Poland and Lithuania, in order to keep a 
balance between the rival powers in the region). Jan Albert's plan was to first recover Chilia and Cetatea Albă 
and then (if possible) to continue further south (not to the east). On the way however, he wanted to dethrone 
Stephen III of Moldavia. The latter, according to his own promises and to the obligations imposed upon him 
by Venice in exchange for the secret funds she sent him, had to support such an anti-Ottoman campaign. Yet 
he knew of John Albert's secret plan and he further knew that Wladislaw II of Hungary and Bohemia, John 
Albert's brother, wanted to disposes Stephen of his Hungarian estates, while also pushing for the dethronement 
of Radu IV of Walachia. With support from Bayezid II, Maximilian I of Habsburg (the main adversary of the 
Jagiellonians), the Hungarian elite hostile to the Jagiellonian brothers, Ivan III of Moscow (who prevented 
Lithuania from aiding the king on campaign) and Radu, Stephen eventually crushed John Albert's army at 
the end of autumn 1497. Yet, until then, in Venice there had been several semi-official rumors that Wladislaw, 
John Albert, Ivan and Stephen, all together (sometimes joined in these rumors by Tartar khan Mengli Ghiray 
as well) had retaken the harbors and were riding towards Constantinople. Venice (maybe even unaware of 
John Albert's ‘secondary’ intentions) apparently had high hopes. In 1498 she ordered a full inquiry into the 
matter and namely on how Stephen had misused/ embezzled her subsidies. Venice's involvement in the 1497 
crisis took her one step closer to a new war with the Porte, which eventually irrupted in 1499 (Nowakowska, 
Natalia. “Poland and the crusade in the reign of King Jan Olbracht, 1492-1501”, Crusading in the Fifteenth Century 
Message and Impact, Norman Housley, ed. Houndmills-Basingstoke-Hampshire-New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004: 128-147; Simon, Alexandru. “The Dying Crusade: The Hungarian Royal Elections of 1490 as Moldavian 
Prequel to the Polish Crusade of 1497”, Worlds in Change. Church Union and Crusading in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Centuries, Christian Gastgeber, Ioan-Aurel Pop, Oliver Jens Schmitt, Alexandru Simon, eds. Cluj-Napoca: 
Center for Transylvanian Studies, 2009: 391-410.
